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found over time, it should be based on official or normal customary rates, although we know that deviations were frequent in practice. Once basic rates are established for each ancient society, it becomes possible to compare rates among different societies.
The present paper argues that the decline in interest rates from Mesopotamia to Greece and Rome cannot be explained "economically" in terms of documented profit or productivity rates, much less the pastoral economics of herding. Such explanations are anachronistic when applied to early antiquity. On the basis of Mesopotamian evidence suggesting that the idea of birth of young animals is to be interpreted metaphorically rather than literally, I propose an explanation based on numerical simplicity of calculation. I then compare Greek, Roman and Byzantine evidence to show that subsequent societies adopted Mesopotamian ideas of setting interest rates in accordance with their local counting and measuring systems.
A comparison of Sumerian, Greek and Roman interest rates and their terminology reveals a pattern not readily apparent when these economies are viewed in isolation. In each region the customary rate reflected the local system of numerical fractions, and specifically the "unit fraction": 1/60 per month in Mesopotamia's sexagesimal system, 1/10 in Greece's decimal system, and 1/12 in Rome's duodecimal system. Ease of computation evidently played an important role. Instead of interest rates being set by economic factors such as productivity levels-and instead of payment being made in the kids or calves as suggested at first glance by the ancient words for interest--arithmetic considerations seem to be at play. Although the words for interest in Sumerian, Greek and Latin all have an association with "birth" or "newborn," what is meant seems to be the periodic accrual or birth of a unit fraction, not literally of young cattle or crops. It was the local numeric system's basic unit-fraction, that is, the smallest unit of the sexagesimal, decimal or duodecimal system: a 60th, 10th and 12th respectively. A widespread common denominator-the local fractional system and its corollary weights and measures--appears to explain how ancient interest rates were set. This principle begins with Sumer's increments of a shekel per month, and continues down through the dekate in Greece and Rome's troy ounce per pound. I conclude that the reason why interest rates declined through classical antiquity is to be found in the fractional arithmetic being used. As late as the Byzantine epoch the 12 per cent rate worked out to a "penny per month." Runciman observes that "When the currency was devalued by reducing the number of nomismata from 100 to 72 per pound of gold after Constantine, "the fixed rate of interest tended to adjust itself to the new figure, to the lender's advantage: till by the Tenth Century 6 per cent had changed to be 6 nomismat a per 1 lb. of gold, that is to say 8.33 per cent; and the maritime speculation would bring in 16.66 per cent."6) More archaic interest rates remained relatively stable over the centuries because they were administered--along with prices and various types of feesby the temples, palace, or in some cases simply by tradition. In the following pages I will suggest how this system of regulation did not respond fluidly to market supply and demand, but reflected a cosmology of nature and society first encountered in Bronze Age Mesopotamia.
6) Runciman 1956.

Who productivity explanations of ancient interest rates are anachronistic
Economists define interest as the periodic payment of a stipulated rate of return on a capital obligation (the principal). The debt usually corresponds to an advance of money, but sometimes it simply accrues as an overdue tax obligation or other charge. Interest-bearing debts typically entail written contracts, pledges of collateral, witnesses and sureties. And often, the rate of interest is publicly regulated (although the degree of enforcement varies).7)
These formalities indicate arms-length transactions, usually among unequals (indeed, obligations among equals often are interest-free, as e.g. the eranos loans among classical Greek aristocrats), in contrast to the more free-floating gift-exchange obligations familiar to anthropologists. Neither gift exchange, dowries or fines bear stipulated interest rates. Gift exchange may involve customary overplus payments (often in the character of one-upmanship), but this is not interest in the formal economic sense of the term. Hence, the link between prestation and the French word for loan, pretre, is not well taken.8) A failure to add something to the reciprocating gift does not lead to legal foreclosure, nor are sureties or contracts involved.
Most economic historians seek to explain interest rates as a usufruct, reflect- Babylonian debt cancellations led to higher agrarian interest rates, and hence to lower land prices. Assuming a modern supply and demand determination of interest rates, he suggests that a low price for land would ensue if interest rates were high and long-term credit short. This would occur if lenders expected that their land foreclosures might be voided by royal Clean Slates. "We need not be advanced economic theoreticians," he argues, "to suppose that there might be a relation between such high rates of interest [33 1/3 percent for barley loans and 20 percent for silver loans] and the possibility of an edict abolishing debt, although we may ask which was first, the risk or the rate."'')
But if the first interest-bearing debts were mercantile silver loans, it seems out of the question that the likelihood of debt cancellations came first, for these did not apply to commercial silver-debts. And Foster does not entertain the possibility that the barley-loan interest rate may initially have reflected the rent rate and remained fixed, willy-nilly.
What really is at issue is whether Mesopotamians thought of interest rates and asset prices as being interlinked. Did they view interest rates as a capitalized rate of return, net of risk, to the point of evaluating the likelihood of debt cancellation and setting their rates accordingly?
There is no evidence that archaic creditors took so durchkomponiert a view of their economy as being a thoroughly integrated, tightly articulated and interconnected system in which a change in risk levels would affect interest rates, and a change in these rates would affect asset prices. This was the Bronze Age, not modern Wall Street or the City of London. In the neo-Babylonian period we see prosperity rising the misharum or andurarum acts becoming a thing of the past, yet interest rates remained constant century after century. This suggests that there was no tatonnement between asset prices, changing risk premiums and interest rates.
Another problem of Foster's reconstruction is that he imagines debts as stemming mainly from advances of money by wealthy individuals to needy borrowers (and hence, facing risks of non-payment). Bust most debts accrued as arrears on various types of obligation, especially those due to royal collectors 10) Foster 1995, p. 167. as taxes or fees of various sorts. In such cases there was no advance of money, but an absence of crop payments to public collectors. When rulers cancelled these debts they were relinquishing payments owed ultimately to themselves (although proximately to their collectors).
Foster speculates as to whether "edicts were part of the problem or the solution. We might further wonder if the edicts did not in fact favor moneylenders in the long term, even if unintentionally--and thus, we might wonder whose benefit the edicts ultimately served."") His idea is that by threatening creditors with a loss of their financial claims, rulers kept interest rates high, making creditors yet wealthier. If this was the case, then what rulers tried to do--to preserve a free landed citizenry by annuling the economy's debt overhead and restoring their land tenure-would be undone by the marketplace. This has become the customary free-market argument against state interference with market forces.
Assyriologists must beware that ideology is at work here. We are dealing with an economic logic designed by economists to dispute the efficacy of public shaping of market forces. This is made explicit by Morris Silver, editor of the volume in which Foster's essay appears. Referring to the Levitical Jubilee Year, Silver insists on "the counterproductive nature of the prophets' economic ideas from a real world standpoint," that is, the standpoint of modem laissez faire urging governments to refrain from interference with market forces. The modem assumption is that no matter what governments do to steer the economy, the market will undo such efforts.12) What were the Babylonians (and for that matter, the Judaeans and Israelites) thinking of? I think they knew something that modern economic theory does not acknowledge: if "market forces" are left to themselves, they lead to widening economic polarization and growing disequilibrium as financial claims on wealth and income tend inexorably to exceed the ability to pay (the Frederick Soddy principle). Interest rates exceeded profit and crop-surplus ("real rent") rates.
One is reminded of Samuel Kramer's complaint that Urukagina's reforms were fruitless, for the usury and impoverishment problem simply began again.'3) Of course it did-and when the economy's financial balance veered too far out of an equitable equilibrium, or simply when a new ruler ascended the throne, the debts were cancelled yet again. This was how the Sumerian and Babylonian debt overhead was prevented from growing too far out of bounds (a counterpart to the "overgrowth" of hubris in Greek social-economic thought). 11) Loc. cit. Comparative anthropology indicates that speculations along these lines are confused about just whose livestock were involved. Heichelheim assumed that cattle were lent by creditors to debtors, and that it was out of their productivity that borrowers were able to pay the stipulated interest. But studies of tribal economies throughout the world indicate that the transfer of livestock invariably is from poor debtors to rich creditors. Stock and other assets are pledged in exchange for necessities, which are consumed or paid as taxes or fines rather than productively invested. It is the debtor's own productive asset that produces a usufruct. Such usury is a pure loss to debtors on the land. It is not paid out 14) Leemans 1950, p. 32. of income generated by the loan, nor out of profits earned on investing the loan's proceeds, but out of the debtor's own stock pledge as collateral. This is why, once ancient cultivators fell into debt, they rarely could get out of it without a royal Clean Slate proclamation.
Anthropologists studying tribal economies have found that when cattle or land are part of the loan process, it is as antichretic collateral (that is, a pledge) that produces a stream of services or usufruct for the creditor. The essence of usury is that the usufruct is not produced by the borrowed capital itself. The normal practice in herding economies is for debtors to pledge their cattle to their creditors, not to receive cattle and prosper by generating a usufruct. The only instances of productive lending (defined as that which provides borrowers with the means to repay their obligations) are commercial advances to merchants.
The preferred forms of collateral through the ages have been the debtor's cattle; his slaves, daughters, wives or sons to perform services in the creditor's household; and later, more public types of assets such as land rights, fishing privileges and mineral rights. But it is difficult to formally express the precise fraction of the debt principal that these antichretic yields represent. Cattle may give birth to calves and provide plowing services and milk, but no economist has come up with an explanation of how to translate the value of these activities into a precise rate of interest. We know that the Sumerians knew that herds do not grow at 33 1/3 per cent per year, for Gelb (1967b) has translated a tablet on the growth of a herd of cattle.'") It hardly can be assumed that Sumerian livestock reproduced more rapidly than Greek livestock, or that the latter increased more quickly than those of Rome. Even at the Roman interest rate of 8 1/3 per cent, animal herds and crop yields hardly could have increased regularly at these rates. In periods of crop failure it must have been hard for many debtors to pay even when no interest was charged. Some other factor than calving rates therefore must have determined the earliest interest rates.
Schneider , This yield implied a reciprocal land price of three years' purchase. In effect, the rent rate set the agrarian interest rate, and hence the effective land price. The idea was for the creditor-buyer to take as interest the same usufruct that could have been obtained by buying the fields outright and leasing them out to sharecroppers.
The first step making the land alienable was precisely to provide creditors with rights to the crop and to the debtor's labor services to harvest it. If cultivators could not yet pledge the land as collateral (and hence, forfeit it) on more than a temporary basis, at least they could give creditors the same yield that could have obtained by taking formal ownership. (Economists call such an arrangement semi-antichretic.)
The reason for this roundabout way of treating what was, in effect, a land transfer as if it were an interest-bearing loan was that land rights were not yet freely alienable and an agrarian labor market barely had developed. Leaving the debtor on the land as its cultivator served the creditor's interest, at least until grain cultivation was replaced by less labor-intensive olive oil and wine cultivation.
In sum, the history of ancient agrarian usury shows repeatedly that the usufructsand increasingly, the collateral-were reaped by creditors. Instead of the interest being paid out of growth in the debtor's income by investing the loan proceeds productively, these charges devoured his already exhausted resources. Such borrowing out of absolute need represents a situation that economists call price-inelastic. The borrower is willing to pay virtually any interest rate as credit becomes a life or death matter. Borrowing was an act of desperation that only made the situation worse. In such cases there is little economic basis for charging one interest rate rather than another.
Ancient usury thus did not reflect the debtor's ability to pay, for a rising proportion of debts were not paid. Needy individuals borrowed out of abject necessity, not to earn a profit. This admission relating to the plight of the rural poor indicates how futile it is to try to explain interest rate levels in reference to productivity or profit rates. The proceeds of agrarian loans were not invested productively to generate an income out of which to pay interest to the creditor, but were consumed or paid out for taxes. And as for industry, it was selffinanced throughout antiquity. Roscher, Bihm-Bawerk and their contemporaries were not blind to this fact that archaic usury was an extortionate phenomenon consisting of "distress debts in contradistinction to acquisition-debts."'7) A growing portion of the population fell into debt bondage and forfeited its lands to foreclosing creditors. Under the 17) Roscher 1878, vol. II, p. 128; see also Finley 1973. rule of oligarchies (ultimately that of Rome), more and more families lost the land rights and traditionally had been their guarantee of political freedom and citizenship.
The final problem of trying to reason economically to explain interest rates by assuming that they reflect pastoral and agricultural productivity rates or market conditions is the fact that interest rates have been administered by law throughout most of history. The rate of 1/60th per month-one shekel per mina-seems to have remained stable within Mesopotamia for over a thousand years, starting with the laws of the Third Dynasty of Ur, shortly before 2000 BC, and extending through the laws of Eshnunna and Hammurapi to NeoBabylonian times.'") Also stable for many centuries was the Roman rate of 1/12th, that is, an uncia (ounce) of copper per year on every as (pound), except when public law (widely flouted, to be sure) cut it in half in the 4th century BC Greek bankers typically paid a decimalized 1/10th (dekate) on deposits. Renger rightly observes that "the unchanging rate of interest throughout the centuries constitutes a strong argument against the existence of a credit market," adding that "the same it true for rental dues which do not fluctuate, thus also indicating that they are not governed by the laws of supply and demand."l9)
The evolving meanings of md?: from kid to fee, (periodic) payment and interest
The relationship between early interest rates and young animals turns on whether kid-and calf-words for interest (and the corresponding words for capital) are to be understood literally or figuratively. Philologists who have examined the Mesopotamian and Indo-European evidence find the relationship to be an afterthe-fact analogy--one that postdates the first charging of money-interest by many centuries, rather than underlying it from the outset. Instead of livestock being lent out in exchange for kids, calves or other young animals being paid as interest, it appears that kid-or "calf"-words for interest, like their agrarian relative "usufruct," are relatively late pastoral analogies for interest-bearing credit.
Two decades before Steinkeller established this fact for the Sumerian language, the Indo-European philologist Emile Benveniste found that contrary to popular impression, the archaic Greek and Latin words for capital came to mean "cattle" relatively late. The Indo-European not *peku (< Latin pecus) originally referred to "personal chattles, movables" in general, and only later narrowed to mean specifically livestock, then smaller livestock and sheep. "Similarly ") The Greek monetary spits (oboloi) and handfuls thereof (drachmae) suggest that cattle or some of the offspring were dedicated to the temple or other community institution annually as firstfruits, and that these proto-tax contributions became a kind of proto-money. But one must be wary of postulating a natural transition from such contributions to specified rates of interest owed on the advance of silver money. It appears that a pecuniary standard was first introduced by the payment of fines (and perhaps of proto-taxes) in animals, silver or other capital items. This word pecuniary, meaning monetary or market-oriented, stems from Latin pecus, meaning cattle either singly or in herds. The word "fee" likewise derives from pecus, as does "feudal." To the extent that cattle were civilization's first pecuniary means of payment, it was not to buy market goods and services but to settle capital-type obligations, by paying reparations, fines (headed by manslaughter compensation), marriage debts and proto-taxes such as contributions to communal sacrifices. In this view, fines for personal injury were the earliest documented "prices," at least for Indo-European speaking societies. (Bridewealth and brideprice were akin to capital transfers in the sense that they completed the merging of families by creating a founding stock for young couples-the reverse of manslaughter fines.) But cattle hardly could have served as money as our epoch understands the term. Their value was higher than most exchanges of goods and services called for. Nearly the same could be said of gold and silver, but cattle were not as readily divisible as were metals.
It seems clear enough that the word capital derives from Latin caput, a head of livestock, while chattel has become a general term for property. But as Benveniste points out, this linguistic fact by itself does not prove that cattle were civilization's first economic capital. Rather, livestock seem to have been taken at some point as prototypical capital in that they produced calves. As Aristotle put it in his famous discussion of usury, silver produces interest for the moneylender as parents produce offspring; yet silver is sterile, not animate. Sumerian economic records begin in readable detail in the Early Dynastic period, 2700-2435 BC. Around 2450, in the time of Urukagina and his "reform" text, Sumerians had to pay the temples or palace a regular mdLi-fee.23) It is not certain whether this was necessarily in the form of lambs or kids. Steinkeller reads the term ms' literally in Ukg 4 iv.2-7: "the surveyors, the chief balapriests, the chief stewards, the brewers, (and) and foreman had to pay silver" fees or "offerings" in the form of fleeces or young kids born to the herds pastured on public fallow lands. His reading is that "in the pre-Sargonic period mda was still used only in its literal sense." But it is not clear why surveyors, brewers and others should make payments relating to the use of grazing lands.24) Urukagina's text describes royal collectors seizing the cattle of cultivators in arrears on their public obligations, which seem to have been due in silver or barley, and to be in the character of irrigation fees or proto-taxes, not interest on money advances. They were akin to debt-service payments mainly by being due periodically. (Rental payments in barley were due upon harvest, while irrigation fees, increasingly due in silver, were payable at the outset of the crop season.)
The term fee seems especially appropriate for such public obligations, inasmuch as its linguistic root is pecus, a semantic counterpart to Sumerian md&. However, the payments seem to have been denominated mainly in silver, sometimes in crops, but not in young animals (although collectors evidently seized these as capital items in lieu of silver or barley arrears). There is no direct confirmation of interest yet being charged on these fees on these arrears.
Steinkeller suspects that the earliest references to mds' payments designate a tax on the growth of flocks, a tax probably paid in kind before being transformed into a silver obligation as Sumer's economy became more commercially oriented. He suggests a derivation from wasabum, "to increase," presumably referring to the growth of herds. But by the time the term mdi can be documented in this new context, it seems to have taken on a broader meaning.
The fact that an interpretation seems reasonable to modem eyes does not by itself make it historically correct, of course. If the evolution of words were entirely reasonable, we would have many fewer riddles to untangle. It is at least as difficult to reconstruct social relations from the history of words as from archaeological ruins. The dice are loaded against any given guess hitting the mark, for language frequently evolves by making semantic leaps that often are idiosyncratic and extremely hard to reconstruct. Thus, is nothing that a word for interest literally signified a kid or calf, we must beware of assuming that the earliest interest actually was paid in young animals or that the first usufruct- The fact that no archaic Egyptian debt records exist might possibly be the result of destruction of the papyrus writing medium, but regions that used clay tablets for public administration, such as Crete and Mycenaean Greece during 1600-1200 BC likewise have left no hint of commercial credit, no pooling of money by partnerships, and-most telling of all-no agrarian debt cancellations. Egypt's sed festivals, unlike their Mesopotamian counterparts, did not allude to debts. The absence of such debt records outside of Mesopotamia prior to the first millennium BC thus does not seem simply to reflect the absence of written documentation. It is the very essence of such debt to be documented.
Where the charging of interest appears earliest outside Mesopotamia--as in Assyria's Asia Minor trade colonies-a comparative analysis of public and sacred laws shows these to derive from southern Mesopotamian practice. In any case, the role of debt was quite circumscribed outside of Mesopotamia, even in commercial economies such as Ugarit, the city-state with the closest ties to the Aegean during 1400-1200 BC. As for Europe's less centralized, tribally organized economies, the historian Tacitus noted as late as the first century of our era that the Germans, whose debts were mainly of the wergild type for legal restitution of damages, were not acquainted with loans at interest.28) This probably can be taken as applying to European tribal communities generally. It follows that the origins of interest are to be understood in terms of Sumerian economic institutions.
Monetary transactions, including the payment of interest, presuppose a system of fractional weights and measures. The first known examples were developed by Sumer's institutional households as part of their distribution of rations and other periodic flows.29) Given the general knowledge of arithmetic, calculations of rations, prices, quantities and interest had to be kept relatively simple. Round numbers were preferable. This was achieved by establishing the most important prices and fees, interest rates and associated "rulings" in round numbers and fractions.
The system of counting, measures and weights was calendrical, largely because of the need to coordinate disbursements on a regularized periodic basis. Reflecting this administrative calendar composed of equal-length months, the sexagesimal (60-based) system of fractional measures and weights was developed. This made it easier to distribute rations to public dependents on a regular monthly basis. It enabled the temples (and the palaces that emerged out of their precincts after about 2800 BC) to regularize their disbursements of food, oil and other basic essentials. The upshot was that periodic disbursement and accruals-above all the distribution of rations and the calculation of interest and rent obligations--were relatively easy to compute, thanks to the sexagesimal system's great flexibility: The number 60 is divisible by eleven roots: 30, 20, 15, 10, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2 and of course 1.
The gur ("bushel") of barley was divided into 30 sdtu = 300 "cups." The idea was to divide monthly barley rations into 60 or 30 equal units for daily consumption by adult males (Lambert 1963:83f.). Women and slaves received half this amount, and children still less, depending on their age. In this way, standardized economic relations were created in a way that integrated weights and measures, prices and ration levels into a single managerial system.
Crop obligations were denominated in barley, mainly because most cultivators had little silver. These barley debts were payable annually upon harvest. But one of the first things to strike the financial historian is that commercial debts (including some rural obligations and fees) were denominated in silver. Most silver was concentrated in the commercial sphere, in which merchants typically operated in association with the large institutions.
For internal temple and palace accounting purposes, the price of barley was set at one gur per shekel of silver. This enabled accounts to be kept simultaneously in silver and barley, creating a "bimonetary" standard. In times of crop failure the market price of grain outside of the public sector might rise substantially, but temple and palace accounts insulated themselves from market fluctuations by using standard "normal" or "book" prices.
The logic underlying these accounting practices provides a key to explain early interest-rate levels. Reflecting the sexagesimal measurement system, the standard weight for measuring silver, the mina, was divided into 60 shekels.
Dovetailing into this system, the rate for commercial debts was set at one shekel per silver mina per month. As the shekel weighed 1/60th of a mina, this worked out annually to 12/60ths, but the point of reference was 60 months. What is important is that the terminology suggests that interest was payable in silver (the commodity being cut), not barley or cattle. This suggests a commercial rather than agricultural context long before pastoral terms for interest came into use. Indeed, there is no indication of calf payments in this commercial sphere.
Also important is Sumer's written notation. Prior to the Ur III period a somewhat confusing set of symbols was used for integers and their fractions. 
35) This notational characteristic may help explain why the archaic term for interest was
In the final century of the third millennium, this notational usage evolved into a place system that represented both the numbers 60 and I by (two perpendicular wedge indentations, crossing one another like a T), much as our 1 signifies 1, 10 or 100 depending on its placement. But inasmuch as cuneiform lacked the idea of zero, the same number symbol meant 1, 60 or 602 depending on its place value. Dilke observes that "The same symbols were also used for writing fractions. So I can be 1/60 or 1/602, and so on.... The result could be confusing even for the Babylonians.... Everything depended on the order of the wedges, reading from left to right. So 77 = 11. But it can also equal 601 (60 x 10 + 1). VT= 2, but W= 61; the difference depends only on careful writing and reading."'6) Readers of cuneiform economic accounts therefore had to decide on the context to know whether a number referred to a fraction or a whole integer.
Birth metaphors for time, numbers and interest
Diakonoff has defined an archaic language as one which, "on the lexical level, has no or only poorly developed means of expressing abstract ideas." Sumerian is a good example. The verb meaning "to kill" is composed of the roots "club, head, break." As an archaic language, it used metaphor and metonymy to convey abstract concepts. "There are no adequate means, either lexical or grammatical, to express such abstract ideas as 'time,' 'space,' 'subject,' 'object,' 'cause,' 'beauty,' 'liberty,' 'invention,' 'multiplication,' 'division' and many others, some of which appear to us elemental, as, e.g., the distinction between 'darkness,' 'calamity,' 'illness,' and 'plain,' etc., or be-tween 'good,' 'enjoyable,' 'kind,' 'happy,' 'useful,' 'luck,' etc.... In the absence of means to express general ideas, one resorts to generalization by tropes (metaphors and metonymies).''37) It follows that words for economic ideas such as interest likewise would be expressed in terms of concrete images.
Bronze Age cosmologies depicted nature anthropomorphically in terms of birth cycles. For instance, the birth metaphor was applied widely to the three basic measures of time: the month, the year and the day. As living beings, they had their respective points of conception at their darkest points; the narrow sliver of the new crescent moon, the winter solstice (December 21 in modern "kid." A number of ancient languages viewed the small unit fraction as a miniature model of the large unit. The Latin word as ("pound") is cognate to Greek heis, "one." Each of the calendars, which January 1 once sought to approximate), and the darkest hour of midnight.38)
The birth metaphor also was applied to numbers and their fractional "children." For it time had a gestation period, so did the numerical cycles used to demarcate it. Indeed, the gestation and birth process provides one of the most common metaphors of human culture. The word metaphor itself means literally pregnant with meaning-"to bear" (pherein) and "beyond" (meta). It thus was natural for the archaic terminology for interest likewise to be based on a birth metaphor, as interest after all is a payment for time.
Numbers were conceived in terms of gender. Seidenberg cites by way of Aristotle the Pythagorean dictum that "odd numbers are male, even numbers are female."39) In some Australian, South American and South African societies, he points out, counting begins with two. The logic seems to be that a coupling must precede the generation of "children." A couple composed of a man, I and a woman, 2, gives birth to a child, making the number 3 ("many"). This trinity of numbers can then generate the modular patterns which form the basic higher number, e.g. 2 + 3 = 5 by addition and 2 x 3 = 6 by multiplication. These in turn may generate as "offspring" 5 x 6 = 30 and 30 x 12 = 360.
At least as early as the Old Babylonian period c. 1800 BC, and probably even earlier, each major deity was assigned a number which was a fraction of 60. As chief of the pantheon, Anu was symbolized by the sign for "1" (or alternatively 60/60ths), and was assigned 22 "children," that is, fractional numbers that divide roundly into 60: 30, 20, 15, 12, 10, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2 and of course 1, and their reciprocals (in our notation a half, a third, a quarter, a fifth, a sixth, a  tenth, a twelfth, a fifteenth, a twentieth and a thirtieth) . The Sumerians called these fractions "children of 60" or sometimes the "children of Anu."
Commenting in Roman times on the sexual anthropomorphism of numbers, Plutarch asserted that the ancient Egyptians knew the 3 x 4 x 5 "Phythagorean" right-angled triangle and the male and female deities associated with it. The upright perpendicular, measuring 3, represented Osiris.40) The base, measuring 4, (being an even number, as well as being horizontal, as a woman was supposed to be) signified Isis. Their offspring was Horus, the hypotenuse 5, a male odd number, which the Pythagoreans called "the marriage number," reportedly following an old Near Eastern tradition. 'daughters' (2P3q5r), formed in the 'image' of their prototypes."'' ) In Sumer's sexagesimal system, cosmological significance thus was found in the fact that 22 x 3 x 5 = 60, a number generated by multiplying twos and threes to generate "offspring."
Once the gender of numbers was established, their ability to give birth to higher series of numbers, and also to fractions, followed naturally. So did the terminology for social processes using these fractions. The birth metaphor was a familiar way of conceiving of growth by incremental units, especially when this occurred on a periodic calendrical basis. In retrospect it is easy to see why a pastoral "birth" or "calf" metaphor would seem especially appropriate. The birthing of most animals occurs at a specific time of year-hence, the association between birth and calendrical regeneration.42) Likewise in the case of interest, a "baby" unit emerges from the full-sized "parent". A mundane corollary of this cosmology was that, to the extent that payment of debts and the accrual of interest became important social phenomena, their timing was set a key calendrical renewal points. In the case of commercial debts this was the transition from one month to the next. In the case of crop debts, payment was made annually at the appropriate New Year. In this way Sumerian debts were associated with the traditional birth metaphor for the periodic renewal of time. What made the reproduction metaphor seem natural was the idea of a "baby" unit fraction being "born" of the full unit, e.g., the shekel from a mina. Minas invested at interest gave birth, and the shekel per mina was due at the inception of each month. Silver-interest was born like a calf, on the key calendrical date when the crescent moon (and certainly by classical antiquity the moon had become the celestial patron deity of silver), also was (re)born. Barley debts and other agrarian crop obligations were due at the end of the crop year, when the harvest was in and the yield was being weighed out on the threshing floor.
The common denominator associating all such payments was the periodicity of time. Confirmation of this principle is provided by Greek and Roman practices in the first millenium. procedures were not pristine indigenous developments in Greece and Italy, the calf metaphor for interest likewise is unlikely to be inherent and universal. I believe that the semantic imagery of interest was adopted from the same Near Eastern sources that pioneered in charging interest on debts.
Classical Greek and
The diffusion of social and economic practices rarely produces an exact copy, of course. The Mediterranean world c. 750 BC was much less centralized than Bronze Age Mesopotamia. Commercial enterprise was conducted mainly via family estates (the classical oikos) as industry and credit flowered in private hands on a smaller and less urbanized scale than that of the Bronze Age citytemples and palaces. These facts would suggest a reduced ability to pay interest. But how was the rate set? In the case of industry, workshops were self-financed rather than funded with borrowed money. In agriculture, credit took the form of usurious "consumer" debt or tax debt under emergency conditions rather than through economic calculation. We therefore must look to noneconomic explanations of Greek and Italian interest rates. The fifth, the fourth, the third, and then the second, And then that day which more than all the rest I loathe and shrink from and abominate, Then comes at once that hateful Old-and-New day, the day when his debts were due.47) (Ancient historians attributed this practice to Solon, but he may merely have systematized it.) Calendrical practices likewise seem to have helped shape Italian temple traditions and contributions, and indirectly to have influenced Roman interest rates. Just as the copper as (pound) was divided into twelve unciae (the origin of the modem troy ounce system), so the XII Tables tradition set the legal rate of interest at 1/12th per year-a "baby" fractional unit being paid as interest on each large or "full" unit. 
Some consequences of "uneconomic" interest rates
Commercial credit seems to have preceded agrarian interest-bearing debts. Mercantile interest rates were lower and remained more uniform. Merchants evidently believed they could make a trading profit sufficient to repay their backers. Partly, this was because they were protected by various stipulations providing that their debts would be annulled in the event of robbery, piracy, or loss of their boats. But no such protection was offered to cultivators. Even classical antiquity's lower rates proved too high for many cultivators to meet in times of drought or infestation, crop failure, warfare and military call-ups, or in the event of the cultivator's own ill health. To maintain economic balance under these conditions, barley debts periodically were cancelled throughout the Old Babylonian period; commercial silver-debts, however, were left intact.
Usury became the major force polarizing ancient society as credit passed out of the hands of public institutions into those of private households. By classical Greek and Roman times, no palace rulers were left to cancel agrarian debts and otherwise keep creditor power in check. Thus, what seems to have begun as justifiable debt in third-millenium Mesopotamia evolved into classical usury. Its corrosive dynamics polarized ancient society more than any other factor, destroying the archaic social balance between rich and poor, mercantile creditors and cultivators, despite the nominal decline in interest rates.
The power of creditors increased in the face of declining royal authority.
problems, but agrarian rates were above the "economic" rate that many cultivators were able to pay. Unlike the case in most countries today (although not in Germany), personal bankruptcy was not available as a means of extracting oneself from debt. The normal resolution of debt problems was to lose one's family members and land-rights, until such time as the ruler might proclaim an agrarian debt cancellation. But such Clean Slates became less frequent after the Middle Bronze Age. Interest-bearing debt without such royal cancellations led to economic polarization of the Babylonian, Greek, Roman and Byzantine economies. 6. There seems to have been a long tradition of considering the loan to be amortized when its interest payments had fully reproduced the principal. A hint of this idea is found in Hammurapi's law (? 117) liberating bondsmen after three years of service. His choice of three years may reflect the fact that agricultural interest rates typically were 1/3 per year. In three years the value of the crop payments or personal services provided by the debt-pledge would have repaid the original debt. Two thousand years later, Justinian's laws explicitly considered the debt was to have been paid off once the interest paid by cultivators had equaled to the initial principal.52) This ruling seems to reflect a longstanding Roman practice.
